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INTIMATIONS OF FEDERAL REMOVAL
JURISDICTION IN LABOR CASES: THE
PLEADINGS NEXUS
Federal jurisdiction over labor cases continues to grow, overreach-
ing perhaps its designated sphere. That sphere is described in part by
section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act,' which gives
federal courts jurisdiction to decide suits involving "contracts" between
employers and unions, or between unions. Recently, the Supreme
Court held in United Association of Journeymen v. Local 334, United
Association of Journeymen 2 that, for purposes of invoking federal juris-
diction over an intra-union labor dispute removed from state court, a
union constitution is a contract within the meaning of section 301. In
dissent, Justice Stevens observed, "This case is important not because
of its unremarkable holding that a union constitution is a contract but
because the case is a striking example of the easy way in which this
Court enlarges the power of the Federal Government-and the Federal
Judiciary in particular-at the expense of the States.' 3
It is a short step from creating federal removal jurisdiction over a
state case concerning a union constitution to creating federal removal
jurisdiction over other disputes tangentially involving collective bar-
gaining-over, for example, a union member's state cause of action
against his employer for back wages. 4 The questions raised by such
cases are how firm a foundation federal jurisdiction requires and how
amenable a federal court should be to imputing federal elements to a
complaint pleaded as a state cause of action. Increasingly, federal
courts have been willing to abandon the traditional touchstones of ju-
1. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976)
[hereinafter cited as section 301]. This section provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
2. 101 S. Ct. 2546 (1981). For a discussion of this case see notes 94-100, 111-13 and accom-
panying text infra.
3. 101 S. Ct. at 2559 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. Compare Talbot v. National Super Mkts., 372 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. La. 1974) (allowing
removal of state court claim for back wages), discussed at notes 122-23 infra and accompanying
text, with Lambright v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. La. 1971) (remanding
to state court employees' claims for back wages), discussed at notes 120-21 infra and accompany-
ing text.
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risdictional determinations in order to foster national labor law, and,
increasingly, plaintiffs' labor suits have been removed from state to fed-
eral courts. In other situations the well-pleaded complaint rules might
be expected to insulate from removal the plaintiff who has not pleaded
a federal claim, much less pleaded it well. In labor disputes, however,
that insulation is often illusory.
In enacting section 301, Congress intended to eliminate procedural
impediments to breach of labor contract suits against unincorporated
labor unions in federal courts.6 In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills 7 the Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 301 are
substantive and authorize federal courts to formulate a body of federal
common law over labor disputes. Since Lincoln Mills, federal jurisdic-
tion under section 301 has expanded steadily, both in regard to what
constitutes a "contract" within the meaning of the section 8 and in re-
gard to the parties that may invoke federal jurisdiction under this sec-
tion.9
5. The well-pleaded complaint rule requires that the complaint, unaided by the answer or
by a petition for removal, show that a federal controversy underlies the cause of action before
federaljurisdiction can be invoked. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Tennessee
v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894). Justice Clarke, writing for the Supreme Court in
Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276 (1918), noted:
The obvious principle. . . is that, in the absence of a fraudulent purpose to defeat
removal, the plaintiff may by the allegations of his complaint determine the status with
respect to removability of a case, arising under a law of the United States, when it is
commenced, and that this power to determine the removability of his case continues with
the plaintiff throughout the litigation, so that whether such a case non-removable when
commenced shall afterwards become removable depends not upon what the defendant
may allege or prove or what the court may, after hearing upon the merits, in inyium,
order, but solely upon the form which the plaintiff by his voluntary action shall give to
the pleadings in the case as it progresses towards a conclusion.
Id at 282.
6. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 15-16 (1947), reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON LA-
BOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAOE-
MENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 421-22 (1974). See Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and
No-Srike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. Rv. 33, 34 (1969). For
an overview of the statutory predecessor to section 301, see Isbrandtsen Co. v. District 2, Marine
Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 256 F. Supp. 68, 75-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
7. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
8. See, e.g., United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Local 334, United Ass'n of Journeymen, 101 S.
Ct. 2546 (1981), discussed at notes 94-101 infra and accompanying text; Sheeran v. General Elec.
Co., 593 F.2d 93, 98-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979) (pension plan was an "integral
part" of collective bargaining agreement), discussed at text accompanying notes 107-08 infra;
Klepacky v. Kraftco Corp., 80 L.R.R.M. 3144 (D. Conn. June 5, 1972) (an oral promise to em-
ployees "merged" into the collective bargaining agreement), discussed at text accompanying notes
102-04 infra.
9. Although section 301 refers specifically to actions between employers and labor unions, it
has been held to give employees the right to sue individually. See Smith v. Evening News Assoc.,
371 U.S. 195 (1962). A district court has even gone so far as to extend the scope of section 301 to
create a cause of action for an employer against his individual employee. See New York State
United Teachers v. Thompson, 459 F. Supp. 677 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). For discussions of Thompson,
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As original federal jurisdiction has grown under section 301, so
has federal removal jurisdiction.10 Thus, whereas in the early days of
the Labor Management Relations Act a plaintiff might not have ob-
tained federal jurisdiction even if he had tried, to invoke it,1I now a
plaintiff might have trouble keeping himself out of federal court, if the
defendant seeks removal.1 2
Generally, no unusual procedural problems arise in removing a
labor case from state to federal court. If the complaint alleges a viola-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement affecting interstate commerce,
the claim falls within the scope of section 301 and is removable. 13
Complications arise, however, when the complaint does not explicitly
invoke section 301, but arguably could be construed to do so. This
situation presents a conflict between the right of a plaintiff to be the
master of his own complaint 4 and the need for a federal forum to de-
termine federal rights and to formulate uniform national labor policy. 15
Although courts generally agree that they may look beyond the face of
see Note, Section 301 of Taft-Hartley Act Gives Employer Cause ofAction Against Employees Who
Personally Breach the Collective BargainingAgreement, 10 CUM. L. REV. 263 (1979); Note, Individ-
ual Employee Liability Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 New
York State United Teachers v. Thompson, 14 NEw ENGLAND L. REv. 848 (1979). But see Com-
plete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 614 F.2d 1110, 1115-16 (6th Cir. 1980) (section 301 "does not
permit an employer to recover damages from individual union members for violation of an agree-
ment not to strike"), aff'd, 101 S. Ct. 1836 (1981).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) authorizes federal removal jurisdiction:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action ispending.(o) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
11. See Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 992, 1202 (1950). The annotator writing in 1950 could state with
authority that "it appears to be difficult to present a substantial Federal question as to the various
labor laws as an essential element of plaintiffs cause of action so as to warrant Federal jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the action arises under the laws of the United States."
12. See 8 FED. REG. EMPLOY. SERv. § 67:112, at 109 (1980). The commentator writing in
1980 had authority for stating that "a state court case under 29 USCS § 185(a) is removable to a
federal court even though the plaintiff has cast his complaint under state law and seeks only state
remedies" (footnotes omitted).
13. See 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3722, at 546-57 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER].
14. See La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
937 (1974).
15. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the role of removal in achieving a uniform federal
labor policy. In Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968), the Court affirmed
removal of an employer's state action brought to enjoin a union from striking. Although the
action fell within the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1976), which denies federal jurisdiction to enjoin strikes, the Court distinguished the issue of
availability of relief to the plaintiff from the issue of federal jurisdiction under section 301. "Re-
DUKE LAW JOURNVAL
a complaint to determine its real nature, 16 the limits of such discretion
are unclear. Taken as a whole, the numerous recent labor cases ad-
dressing this issue form no seamless web of jurisprudence, but rather
show the jurisdictional tangles that result when federalism confronts
the need for a uniform national labor policy. Focusing on recent state
causes of action that defendants have sought to remove to federal fo-
rums, this comment outlines the elements necessary for a cause of ac-
tion to arise under section 30117 and explores the courts' willingness to
look beyond complaints to find these elements. The comment con-
cludes with a plea for greater jurisdictional certainty by closer adher-
ence to the well-pleaded complaint rule.18
I. BACKGROUND: REMOVAL
Since 1887 removal jurisdiction has been tied explicitly to the re-
quirements of original jurisdiction:' 9 the case to be removed must be
"founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or
laws of the United States .... ,,20 One must note, however, that the
factors to be considered in determining removal jurisdiction are not
interchangeable with those used in determining whether a complaint
originally brought in federal court would have properly invoked origi-
nal federal question jurisdiction. Certain considerations emerge
uniquely apposite to the issue of removal: that the plaintiff is the
master of his claim,2 1 that he has the prerogative of choosing his fo-
moval is but one aspect of 'the primacy of the federal judiciary in deciding questions of federal
law.'" 390 U.S. at 560 (quoting England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1963)).
The Court in Boys Mkt., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), reaffirmed the
Avco approach, noting that state courts practically had been ousted ofjurisdiction in section 301
suits seeking to enjoin unions from striking pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and that otherwise, federal courts would be frustrated in achieving a uniform federal labor
policy. Id at 245.
For further discussion of this issue, see Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork
of Avco and Philadelphia Marine on the Fabric ofNational Labor Policy, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 980
(1969); Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to
Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REV. 32 (1969); Lesnick, State-Court Injunctions and the Federal
Common Law ofLabor Contracts: BeyondNorris-LaGuardia, 79 HARv. L. REV. 757 (1966); Note,
Labor Law: Removal of Suitsfor Injunctive Relief Under Section 301 ofhe Taft-Hartley Act, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 907 (1965); Note, Removal of and State Court Jurisdiction OverActions Seeking to
Enjoin Strikes in Violation of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1096 (1965).
16. See 1 J. MOORE & J. WICKER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.160, at 185-87 (2d ed. 1979).
17. See notes 55-117 infra and accompanying text.
18. See notes 118-32 infra and accompanying text.
19. See Flory, Federal Removal Jurisdiction, 1 LA. L. REV. 499, 512 (1939).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976). For an excellent discussion and criticism of the "arising
under" doctrine, see Note, The Outer Limits of"Arising Under," 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 978 (1979). See
also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 13, § 3722.
21. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
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rum,
2 2 and that he may defeat removal by good faith avoidance of alle-
gations that would establish federal jurisdiction;23 that improper
removal will expose the plaintiff to the risk of being forced to litigate
his claim in federal court only to have an appellate court deny federal
jurisdiction;24 that strategic advantages are likely to motivate the de-
fendant to seek removal;25 that state tribunals can best resolve state
issues;26 that comity between federal and state courts should be pro-
moted and friction deterred;27 and that the overloading of federal
courts should be avoided.28
On the other hand, one must consider the risk that the defendant
might lose his right to litigate an intrinsically federal issue in federal
court.29 State courts are likely to guard federal interests less zealously
than federal courts.30 Although the defendant has the possibility of ob-
taining review by the United States Supreme Court, that possibility is
remote.31
Antecedent to these considerations, however, is consideration of
the plaintiff's claim. If the plaintiff has not sued on a federal claim, the
defendant has no right to be sued in a federal court.32 A federal forum
should not be ordained for every appearance of a federal element in a
state claim. The well-pleaded complaint rule provides a convenient
rule of thumb by which jurisdiction is determined on the face of the
complaint and by which cases of merely peripheral federal significance
are weeded out of federal courts.33
Gully v. First National Bank34 has been instrumental in promoting
a strict interpretation of the "well-pleaded" requirement. Justice Car-
dozo, writing for the Supreme Court, held that removal to federal court
requires that the federal claim be an essential element of the plaintiff's
cause of action: "A genuine and present controversy, not merely a pos-
22. Jones v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1976).
23. Id
24. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 13, § 3721, at 537.
25. See generally Summers, 4nalysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity
Cases, 47 IowA L. REv. 933 (1962).
26. See Wechsler, Federal Jursdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 216, 218 (1948).
27. See Krey Packing Co. v. Hamilton, 572 F.2d 1280, 1284 (8th Cir. 1978).
28. See People v. Glendale Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 728, 732 (C.D. Cal.
1979).
29. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 13, § 3721, at 537.
30. See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 233-35.
31. See id 218.
32. See 65 HARV. L. REv. 1443, 1444 (1952).
33. See Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case ,4rise "Directly" Under
Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 894 (1967).
34. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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sible or conjectural one . . . must be disclosed upon the face of the
complaint, unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal. ' 35
But even in laying down these criteria for a well-pleaded complaint,36
Cardozo warned against mechanical determinations of federal jurisdic-
tion. He urged a "common-sense accommodation of judgment to ka-
leidoscopic situations" in determining whether the federal controversy
is basic to the claim or merely collateral. 37
Commentators have criticized this distinction between "collateral"
and "basic" issues as too nebulous for meaningful application.38 Some
have suggested that a federal defense to a state claim should suffice to
allow removal and that this approach would better serve the purposes
of federal-question jurisdiction.39 Despite this criticism, the Gul rule
of strict construction of pleadings generally has persisted as the guide
for determining removal jurisdiction.40 In La Chemise Lacoste v. Ali-
gator Co.41 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reiterated that
the removal procedure "reflects a congressional policy of severe
abridgement of the right to remove a state action to a federal court"
and insisted that the plaintiff's initial pleading must set forth the basis
for removal.42
When mixed state and federal claims are considered under the
statutory "arising under" standard,43 however, the determination of
federal jurisdiction is less clear-cut.4 The court must attempt to deter-
35. Id at 113.
36. The "well-pleaded complaint" rule actually was engendered in Gold-Washing & Water
Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877), in which the Court affirmed removal to federal court of an action
involving federal regulation of water rights.
37. 299 U.S. at 118.
38. See, ag., WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 13, § 3722, at 555; Cohen, supra note
33, at 905.
39. See ALL, STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS § 1312 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1966); Moore, Problems of the Federal Judiciary, 35 F.R.D.
305, 316 (1964). Such a view is as nostalgic as it is progressive. Federal courts originally allowed
removal on the basis of a federal defense. See Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135 (1880).
In 1887, Congress amended the removal statute to limit removal jurisdiction to those cases that a
plaintiff might have brought originally in a federal court. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat.
552, as amendedby Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1441
(1976)). In Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894), the Supreme Court held
that under this removal provision, federal jurisdiction must be disclosed by the complaint, un-
aided by the answer. See Note, supra note 20, at 992-93.
40. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1949); First Nat'l Bank v.
Aberdeen Nat'l Bank, 627 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1980).
41. 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir.), cer. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1974).
42. 506 F.2d at 344.
43. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
44. See Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1973), in which the Court
held that federal jurisdiction existed for a possessory land claim, even though such a claim was
traditionally a state cause of action. The Court pointed to the federal laws giving right to posses-
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mine the "real" nature of the claim, Le., whether it is essentially federal
irrespective of the plaintiff's characterization of it.45 Obviously, fastidi-
ous adherence to the well-pleaded complaint rule would open the door
to manipulation by plaintiffs, who could circumvent federal jurisdic-
tion of an essentially federal claim simply by omitting the federal in-
gredients from their pleadings. Hence, if a plaintiff pleads artfully or in
bad faith to frustrate federal jurisdiction, courts will not allow the fail-
ure to plead a federal claim to defeat removal. 6
Some courts have been willing to look beyond the complaint to the
petition for removal to determine if a substantive issue of federal law is
involved,47 although this practice is contrary to Cardozo's admonition
in G4d*y.48 Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc. 49 is an influential
labor case permitting the petition for removal to establish federal juris-
diction. The holding in Fay, however, is narrow: where it is necessary
to determine whether a labor union is "representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce" within the meaning of section 301, it is
permissible to look to the petition for removal to establish the union's
status.50 Although such a limited departure from Guiiy scarcely vio-
lates its spirit, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in La Chemise
Lacoste v. A ligator Co. 51 took pains to avoid legitimizing Fay's ap-
proach. The court criticized attempts by the lower courts to "engraft
exceptions contrary to the legislative policy so zealously protected by
the Supreme Court."'5 2 The court stopped short, however, of rejecting
Fay's underlying rationale, which rested on the preemptive nature of
section 301.53 Whether courts may look to petitions for removal to es-
tablish federal jurisdiction remains an unresolved issue.54
sion as the basis for federal jurisdiction in satisfaction of the well-pleaded complaint rule. See
generally Note, supra note 20, at 983-84.
45. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 13, § 3721, at 530-32 and cases collected
therein.
46. Id § 3722, at 564.
47. Id 561.
48. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
49. 98 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
50. Id at 280. Accord, George D. Roper Corp. v. Local 16, Stove, Furnace & Allied Appli-
ance Workers, 279 F. Supp. 717 (S.D. Ohio 1968); Minkoffv. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp.
870 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), af'd, 279 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1960). For a criticism of Fay, see 65 HARv. L.
REv. 1443 (1952).
51. 506 F.2d 339 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 937 (1974) (vacating district court's grant of
federal removal jurisdiction in suit for declaratory judgment of trademark rights).
52. 506 F.2d at 345.
53. See id at 346. For a discussion of La Chemise Lacoste, see Note, Removal---State Declar-
atoryActions Based on Federal Question Jurisdiction-LaChemfse Lacoste v. Aligator Co., 17 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 72 (1975).
54. See WRIrGH, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 13, § 3722, at 561, and cases cited therein.
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II. THE SECTION 301 CAUSE OF ACTION: NECESSARY ELEMENTS
The central issue in deciding whether to allow removal via section
301 is whether the facts alleged are sufficient to establish a claim there-
under. This broad question can be divided into three parts. Is the
plaintiff's cause of action contractual in nature? Does the contract fall
within the purview of section 301? Are the parties to the suit appropri-
ate for a section 301 cause of action?
A. Finding a Contractual Violation.
Section 301 requires a violation of a collective bargaining agree-
ment before federal jurisdiction is invoked. A question may arise
whether the plaintiff has in fact claimed a contractual breach. In
Bradmon v. FordMotor Co. ,5 for example, the plaintiff, a former Ford
employee, alleged that Ford had wrongfully discharged him in retalia-
tion for his filing a workmen's compensation claim. The plaintiff's
state cause of action was founded on the recent Michigan case of
Sventko v. Kroger Co. ,56 which had held that an "at will" employee has
a state cause of action against his employer for wrongful termination.
57
The plaintiff in Bradmon also asserted rights under Michigan's work-
men's compensation law. The defendant successfully sought removal,
alleging that federal law governed pursuant to section 301. On its first
denial of the plaintiff's motion to remand to state court, the district
court summarily found that the complaint had alleged a violation of
the collective bargaining agreement:
The gist of plaintiff's claim ... is unlawful discharge. Defendant
alleges ... that plaintiff's rights with respect to wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment are governed by the collective
bargaining agreement entered into by itself and... plaintiff's bar-
gaining agent. If the discharge was unlawful, it was a violation of
that agreement. Therefore, this is a suit "for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employ-
ees in an industry affecting commerce. . ."; it follows that this Court
has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute.5 8
Apparently, the court presupposed not only that the complaint sounded
in contract but also that an "at will" employee has no contractual basis
other than the collective bargaining agreement on which to sue, even if
55. No. 78-70913 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 1980).
56. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
57. Id. at 647-49, 245 N.W.2d at 153-54.
58. Bradmon v. Ford Motor Co., No. 78-70913, slip op. at 5-6 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 1978)
(first denial of motion to remand), quoted in No. 78-70913, slip. op. at 2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14,
1980), appeal docketed, No. 80-1788 (6th Cir. Nov. 28, 1980).
[Vol. 1981:743
Vol. 1981:743] THE PLEADINGS NEXUS
the employee believes he does.59
On rehearing of his motion to remand, the plaintiff contended that
his state cause of action sounded in tort, not contract. Because section
301 applies specifically to suits for violations of labor contracts, actions
sounding in tort are not within its purview and hence not removable
via this section.60 The court acknowledged that an employee's state
claim of unlawful discharge might sound in tort, depending on how
one interpreted Sventko v. Kroger Co. 61 The federal court determined,
however, that it should have removal jurisdiction. The court reasoned
that the public policy underlying Sventko, the protection of "at will"
employees, should not extend to an employee who has the protection of
a collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff therefore had no valid
state cause of action, and the federal court refused to remand.62 The
court also did not foreclose the alternative interpretation that the claim
sounded in contract pursuant to section 301.63 Thus the plaintiff was
ousted of his state claim. Regardless of what cause of action he had
59. It is unclear from the opinion why this presupposition should be made. If one were
searching for authority, one might consider these remarks from N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967) (footnote omitted):
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic
strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the em-
ployees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improve-
ments in wages, hours, and working conditions. The policy therefore extinguishes theindividual employee's power to order his own relations with his employer and creates apower vested in the chosen representative to act in the interest of all employees ...
Thus only the union may contract the employee's terms and conditions of employment,
and provisions for processing his grievances ...
This authority, however, does not foreclose the possibility of implied contractual rights, the viola-
tion of which would not necessarily constitute a violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
Nor does it foreclose the possibility of a private contract with the employer independent of the
collective bargaining agreement.
60. Thus a truck driver's state suit against his employer for malicious arrest and prosecution,
tortious interference with his labor contract, and libel was not removable to federal court, for the
cause of action sounded in intentional tort, not contract. See Collins v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
No. 80 C 3112 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1980). Likewise, a union's state claim against non-union con-
tractors for tortious interference with their labor agreements was held non-removable. See Furri-
ers Joint Council v. Independent Fur Contractors Ass'n, 99 L.R.R.M. 2417 (S.D.N.Y. July 28,
1978). See also Brough v. United Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1971) (state cause of action
for employer's negligence was non-removable); Sepia Trucking Co. v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters Local 705, No. 80 C 403 (N.D. MI1. July 31, 1980) (state cause of action for tortious
interference with contractual relations not removable as arguably alleging a "secondary boycott"
under 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (1976)).
61. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
62. No. 78-70913, slip op. at 6-7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 1980). But as the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit has noted, "It is ... irrelevant that plaintiff may, in fact, have no valid state
cause of action, but at best only a federal one; he is free to select the suit he will bring." Brough v.
United Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748, 749 (1st Cir. 1971).
63. No. 78-70913, slip op. at 4-5.
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intended, the court could discern in his claim a seed of federal concern
that had to blossom in federal court.
The result in Bradmon seems a usurpation of state jurisdiction
and, considering that the court believed the cause of action was "best
understood as tort based," 4 an unjustifiable one. The significance of
the case lies in the court's willingness to look not only beyond the com-
plaint, but beyond section 301 itself to base federal removal jurisdiction
not upon a well-pleaded complaint of a violation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement but upon a doubtful characterization of the cause of
action as one based on a dispute over the interpretation and enforce-
ability of a contract. Bradmon, however, is not unique. Another court,
following an equally amorphous standard of federal jurisdiction, con-
sidered whether the complaint arose from "the common nucleus of op-
erative facts" of the collective bargaining agreement.65 Under so broad
a test it seems likely that almost any labor-related suit brought by a
party to a collective bargaining agreement against another party to that
agreement could be thrust into federal court pursuant to section 301.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has stopped short of
so broad a warrant of federal jurisdiction. In Jones v. General Tire &
Rubber Co. 66 an employee sought damages and reinstatement after he
was promoted from an hourly position to a salaried position and later
discharged by his employer. In state court the plaintiff asserted an
implied contractual right to return to his old hourly position. The fed-
eral court could not find a basis for removal jurisdiction via section
301, though the plaintiff's complaint asserted that the implied contrac-
tual right arose partly from "negotiated collective bargaining agree-
ments."67 The court noted that the plaintiff had not asserted a violation
of federal labor law in his complaint and that his alleged contractual
right could not arise under any construction of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.68
64. Id at 4.
65. Chapman v. Southeast Region I.L.G.W.U. Health and Welfare Recreation Fund, 265 F.
Supp. 675, 678 (D.S.C. 1967) (allowing removal to federal court of action brought by non-union
employees against their employer for wrongful withholding of vacation pay).
66. 541 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1976).
67. Id at 661.
68. Id at 662-64. f. Adams v. Budd, 349 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1965) (employee claim founded
on pre-collective-bargaining-agreement promise of seniority did not allege violation of collective
bargaining agreement so as to be within the scope of section 301). It seems that the Jones court
has gone too far in limiting federal jurisdiction. The court apparently denied federal jurisdiction
because it deemed the claim based on an implication from the contract as substantively lacking in
merit. The correct disposition of such a claim would appear to be to retain removal jurisdiction
and render judgment on the pleadings for the defendant. See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647,
649 (1963); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1946).
[Vol. 1981:743
THE PLEADINGS NEXUS
Similarly, when an employee sued in state court (on a cause of
action based exclusively on state principles of contract law) for a
breach of his employer's oral promise to promote him to a supervisory
position with higher pay, a federal court refused removal jurisdiction,
even though the plaintiff was at all times subject to a collective bargain-
ing agreement. In a straightforward application of the well-pleaded re-
quirement, the court refused to allow the defendant to invoke federal
jurisdiction by raising the bargaining agreement as a defense.69
Some of the uncertainty about the nature of the plaintiff's claim
evolves from the fact that state courts, being courts of general jurisdic-
tion, generally require no pleading of subject matter jurisdiction.70 Be-
cause the plaintiff is never required to state whether he is invoking
federal jurisdiction, the federal court is compelled to read something
into the complaint. If the court reads into the complaint a claim of
contractual breach arising under section 301, then federal law will pre-
empt state law.71
Hence in Johnson v. England72 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit allowed removal of a union's state cause of action to compel
arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement: section
301(a) preempted state law claims and the plaintiff's claim was neces-
sarily a federal one.73 That result is consistent with the Supreme
Court's view that, in contract disputes arising under section 301, "the
need for a single body of federal law [is] particularly compelling. ' '74
Because the plaintiff union specifically alleged a breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the claim arose under section 301(a), and
federal law controlled. Thus removal properly was allowed.
69. Wolowiec v. Mogen David Wine Corp., No. 80 C 6855 (E.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 1981).
70. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CVL PROCEDURE 613-14 (2d ed. 1977). Official Form 2(c),
on the other hand, directs the plaintiff alleging federal jurisdiction founded on a particular federal
statute to specify that statute in his pleading. See 5 C. WRorr & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1210, at 95 (1969 & Supp. 1981).
71. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962) (holding that al-
though state and federal jurisdiction are concurrent under section 301, local law must yield to
federal law in resolving an arbitration dispute arising under a collective bargaining agreement).
Note that the preemption doctrine at issue here is not the same as that involved in preempting
state and federal courts of jurisdiction of claims within the jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board, as that doctrine was enunciated in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gar-
mon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For an analysis of the labor law preemption doctrine, see Cox, Labor
Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337 (1972). The Lucas Flour Court ruled that the
Garmon preemption doctrine is "not relevant" to section 301 suits. 369 U.S. at 101 n.9. See also
William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16 (1974).
72. 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966).
73. 356 F.2d at 48.
74. 369 U.S. at 104.
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Before a court determines that federal law preempts state law by
force of section 301, however, the court must determine the nature of
the plaintiff's claim, i e., whether the claim is for a violation of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. It is not clear that a claim concerning an
arbitration dispute invariably should fall within the scope of section
301(a), even if the collective bargaining agreement provides for arbitra-
tion. For instance, in Kallen v. District 1199, National Union of Hosoital
& Health Care Employees75 an arbitrator had ordered an employer to
make overdue contributions to employee benefit fund accounts. The
employer petitioned the state court to vacate the award. The union
successfully removed the suit to federal court pursuant to section 301
despite the plaintiff's contention that he had alleged no violation of a
collective bargaining agreement. The court observed that the bargain-
ing agreement provided for arbitration of grievances and that because
the employer engaged in interstate commerce, federal law applied to
the interpretation of the contract. A contract provision made the arbi-
tration final and binding on the parties, and the court reasoned that by
participating in the arbitration, the employer implicitly had agreed
"that federal court intervention may be sought to compel compli-
ance."
76
Had this suit been an action to enforce the arbitrator's award, the
result in Kallen would seem compelling: in a bargaining agreement
which provides for binding arbitration, an assertion of the award is in
fact an assertion of the contract and is a claim arising under federal
law. Kallen is 'problematic, however, in that the action was to vacate
the award, not to enforce it. The union sought to assert the arbitration
clause as a defense. It is fundamental to the meaning of "well-
pleaded" that a defendant cannot remove a suit from state court on the
basis of a federal defense.77 The Kallen court justified its decision by
noting that an action to vacate an award could as easily have been
brought by the other party in an action to confirm the award. Because
the action to confirm is within section 301(a), the court reasoned, juris-
diction should not depend upon who wins the race to the courthouse. 78
75. 574 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1978).
76. Id at 726. In Varley v. Tarrytown Assoc., Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973), the court
disallowed removal in similar circumstances, noting that interstate implications of a contract are
an insufficient basis to support section 301 jurisdiction. This holding was limited in I/S Stavborg
v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974). Unlike Varley, Stavborg involved
a collective bargaining agreement that contained a provision like the one in Kallen, that the arbi-
trator's award was to be "final." Id at 426-27. See also Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Local
1115, Joint Bd., 377 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (allowing removal of suit to set aside arbitra-
tor's award).
77. See Louisville & Nashville K.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
78. 574 F.2d at 725.
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The court's reasoning is logical, but the train of thought seems doomed
for a head-on collision with Louisville & Nashville RR v. Mottley.7 9
The proper question is not who might have won a hypothetical race to
the courthouse, but whether the plaintiff has alleged a federal claim-
in particular, whether he has alleged a violation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
Discarding the well-pleaded criterion in favor of more attenuated
policy concerns poses its own risks. For example, in Carillo v. Local
1115, Joint Board of Nursing Home & Hospital Employees80 an em-
ployer sought in state court to stay arbitration proceedings relating to
the employer's alleged refusal to grant wage increases pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement. The union defendant removed the ac-
tion to federal court. The collective bargaining agreement, however,
prohibited either party from seeking removal to federal court of a state
court action to compel arbitration. The court found that the question
of the possible breach occasioned by the defendant's removing the suit
was one for arbitration, since the contract required arbitration of dis-
putes over any contract provisions.81 The court declared "the jurisdic-
tional squabble . . . meaningless" and considered remand to state
court "wasteful and duplicative."8 2 Since the only question before the
court was which court, state or federal, would act, it is unclear why the
remand would have been "duplicative" or "meaningless." In effect, the
court allowed the defendant, by manufacturing a question of contrac-
tual breach in the act of removing, to determine the forum for deciding
the arbitrability issue and to displace the plaintiff's state cause of ac-
tion.
An allegation of the breach of a union's duty of fair representation
does not necessarily give rise to federal jurisdiction under section 301.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in In re Carter 3 recently
stated that "a breach of the duty of fair representation is not always
also a breach of the collective contract. 8s4 Hence the court found no
basis to remove via section 301 an employee's suit alleging a conspiracy
79. 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
80. 441 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
81. Id at 621.
82. Id.
83. 618 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1410 (1981).
84. 618 F.2d at 1104. See Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1980) (action
iur breach of duty of fair representation held non-removable where "bad faith" was not alleged);
5( UAW Local 375 v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 331, 336-37 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (action
for breach of duty of fair representation removable only in context of suit for breach of collective
bargaining contract). But see Guaracino v. Communications Workers Local 2552, 330 F. Supp.
679, 680 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (breach of duty of fair representation is breach of collective bargaining
agreement within scope of section 301).
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by labor unions to deny him employment and union membership. The
court did allow removal, however, based on the statutory duty of fair
representation derived from sections 8(b) 85 and 9(a)86 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.87 -Apparently then, a suit for breach of the
duty of fair representation should always be removable pursuant to the
alternate statutory grounds. Such a result cannot be expanded, how-
ever, to include within section 301 all collective-bargaining torts. 88
At least one court has found a section 301 cause of action in a
claim of infringement of constitutional rights. In Robbins v. George W.
Prescott Publishing Co. 89 a discharged employee sued his employer in
state court on a claim, inter alia, that the employer had violated "a host
of state and federal constitutional provisions." 90 The plaintiff alleged a
private cause of action for injunctive relief and damages under state
law. The federal court refused to remand this count of the complaint,
holding that federal preemption under section 301 applied even though
the complaint was couched in constitutional terms: "A contrary ruling
would permit [the plaintiff] to make an end-run around the strong fed-
eral policy favoring resolution of labor disputes through the grievance-
arbitration mechanism." 91 Yet the court refused to tackle the question
whether this was in fact a section 301 dispute.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976).
86. Id § 159(a).
87. See 618 F.2d at 1104. Interestingly, in Carter the defendant, not the plaintiff, was seeking
remand to state court. Upon removal to federal court, the plaintiff had made no objection to
federal jurisdiction and had won a jury verdict in his favor. The defendant then sought to remand
to the state court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court ordered the case re-
manded. The circuit court's casting about for grounds to sustain federal jurisdiction probably
reflects the court's disapproval of the defendant's acrobatic trial strategy. See also Grisbaum v.
Meat Cutters Trust Fund, 482 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (basing removal jurisdiction on
statutory duty of fair representation).
88. See UAW Local 375 v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (no
section 301 jurisdiction for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in collective
bargaining agreement negotiations). See also Coulston v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 423 F.
Supp. 882 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (implication of doctrine of federal preemption does not create statutory
federal-question jurisdiction in cause of action for malicious interference with employment). But
see Nedd v. UMW, 556 F.2d 190, 198 n.12 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978),
holding that "a claim of tortious interference with a collective bargaining agreement by a Fund
Trustee states a non-frivolous cause of action under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act sufficient to
support pendent jurisdiction of state law claims in federal court."
89. [1981] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 12,816 (D. Mass. Nov. 14, 1980).
90. Id at 17,785.
91. Id, at 17,786. See also Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1980)
(complaint alleging violations of constitutional rights, among other common-law causes of action,
was construed as alleging a breach of the collective bargaining agreement under section 301, and
hence was removable from state court).
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B. Finding a Section 301 Contract.
Section 301 specifically applies to "[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
... or between any such labor organizations . *... ,92 Clearly this
provision applies to contracts other than collective bargaining agree-
ments. Its scope, however, is not sharply defined. In Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,93 the Court found that an agreement to arbi-
trate, being the quid pro quo of a no-strike clause, was enforceable
under section 301. Recently, the Supreme Court held that a union con-
stitution is a section 301 contract for purposes of invoking federal re-
moval jurisdiction. In United Association of Journeymen v. Local 334,
UnitedAssociation of Journeymen,94 a parent union ordered nine of its
local unions to consolidate. One of the locals filed suit in state court to
enjoin the order, making the complaint, inter alia, that the consolida-
tion violated the union constitution. The parent union removed the
case to federal district court. The Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit raised, sua sponte, the question of federal jurisdiction.95 The court
observed that "the intent of Congress in enacting § 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act was to grant jurisdiction to the federal
courts over suits based on contracts significant to the maintenance of
labor peace.' ' 96 Finding that the consolidation involved no "significant
impact" on labor-management relations or industrial peace, the court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction and remanded the suit to state
court.
9 7
The majority opinion of the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
"significant impact" test applied by the Third Circuit. The Court de-
duced from the sparse legislative history that Congress had intended
not only to promote industrial peace by stabilizing the collective bar-
gaining process, but also to stabilize labor organizations by making
them legally accountable for agreements entered into among them-
selves.98 The Court noted that appellate courts have long characterized
union constitutions as contracts and that the prevailing view under
92. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
93. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
94. 101 S. Ct. 2546 (1981).
95. Local 334, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 628 F.2d 812 (3d
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2546 (1981).
96. 628 F.2d at 820.
97. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also demands, as a prerequisite for fed-
eral jurisdiction, that the intra-union dispute affect external labor relations. See Lodge 1380, Bhd.
of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 1980); Washington Local 104 v.
International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 621 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1980).
98. 101 S. Ct. at 2551-52.
Vol. 1981:743]
DUKE LAW JO UP.X4L
state law comported with that characterization. 99 Furthermore, by not
qualifying the term "contract" in section 301, Congress had evinced its
intent to reach union constitutions as well as collective bargaining
agreements. Therefore, the Court rejected the "significant impact" test
as one that would "engage the Federal Courts in the sort of ad hoc
judgments on the jurisdictional sufficiency of the pleadings that the un-
fettered language of § 301(a) belies." 1°
It is manifestly unclear, however, how a court is to determine that
section 301(a) has been invoked at all without judging the sufficiency of
the pleadings, unless specific types of labor disputes have been previ-
ously corralled within the boundaries of section 301 by judicial fiat.
But it is equally unclear how courts can practice judicial fiat except on
an ad hoc basis. The Court appears, in fact, merely to have created
greater jurisdictional uncertainty for disputes arising just beyond the
pale of Journeymen's facts.
In dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Court had lost sight of
the constitutional justification for Congress's regulation of collective
bargaining agreements under the commerce clause-the federal inter-
est in maintaining industrial peace. To abandon the jurisdictional
touchstone of the federal interest is to permit "the creation of federal
law in a dispute implicating no federal interest. Absent a limitation
restricting § 301 jurisdiction on the basis of the presence of a federal
interest or right, it will be difficult for district courts to determine what
contracts are not encompassed by section 301."101
The jurisdictional determination thus becomes more, not less, ad
hoc. The question arises, for instance, whether a dispute over a private
contract between an employee and an employer falls within section
301. Absent a "significant impact" test, the only question would appear
to be the coalescence of the private contract and the collective bargain-
ing agreement. In Kiepacky v. Kraftco Corp. 102 laid-off truck drivers
sued in state court for their employer's breach of a promise to provide
them with vested seniority on their milk routes. Although they alleged
no breach of the collective bargaining agreement, removal was allowed:
'While the plaintiffs[-]drivers may have been unknowledgeable of the
principles of labor law and may have been actually misled by their
employer to forego termination pay benefits, under the existing [bar-
99. In dissent, Burger, CJ., observed that state-court construction of union constitutions has
"little bearing on the construction of the Labor Management Relations Act." Id. at 2554 n.4
(Burger, CJ., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2551 n.10.
101. Id. at 2557 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. 80 L.R.R.M. 3144 (D. Conn. June 5, 1972).
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gaining agreement], any individualized side agreement. . . is merged
in the written labor contract."' 0 3 Pursuant to national labor policy, the
collective bargaining agreement was deemed to be the sole determinant
of the plaintiffs' rights. 1°4
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has taken a more re-
strictive view of removal jurisdiction based on private contracts. In
Medlin v. Boeing ertol Co. 105 discharged employees sued for reinstate-
ment based on independent rights allegedly created by letters from
their employer. The court held that the claim was removed improvi-
dently from state court: although the collective bargaining agreement
stipulated grievance procedures as the exclusive disposition procedure
for all claims, that agreement "constituted no more than a backdrop for
the plaintiffs' claim .... -1o6
Similarly, the question arises whether a pension plan dispute falls
within section 301. In Sheeran v. GeneralElectric Co. 107 retired employ-
ees with vested pension benefits brought suit in state court seeking in-
creased benefits. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, holding
the suit removable, found that the pension plan was an "integral part"
of the bargaining agreement because the plan was "incorporated by
reference in the labor contract."' 08 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, on the other hand, concluded in Journeymen0 9  that
"[a]lthough pension and welfare benefits are the product of collective
bargaining, they are essentially autonomous trust funds established
103. Id at 3146.
104. Id Cf Riley v. Letter Carriers Local 380, 485 F. Supp. 980 (D.N.J. 1980) (alleged oral
agreement relating to provisions of collective bargaining agreement was sufficient to establish fed-
eral jurisdiction under 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1976), which provides federal jurisdiction for suits for
violations of contracts between the Postal Service and labor unions representing postal employ-
ees).
It is not apparent from the opinion in Klepacky whether the court meant that the collective
bargaining agreement explicitly encompassed all individual side agreements (no other reference is
made to such a provision in the opinion) or whether the court is referring to provisions of the
bargaining agreement requiring arbitration of all disputes. See 80 L.R.R.M. at 3145 n.1. The
latter interpretation would also bring side agreements within the shadow of the bargaining agree-
ment. Hence, either interpretation merges private contracts into the collective bargaining agree-
ment as a basis of removal jurisdiction. Contra, Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957 (3d
Cir. 1980), discussed at text accompanying notes 105-106 infra.
105. 620 F.2d 957 (3d Cir. 1980).
106. Id at 962. Cf. Pajares v. United Steelworkers Local 5769, 432 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. La.
1977) (no federal jurisdiction under section 301 for union officer's complaint that he had been
denied seniority privileges, for the contract allegedly violated was not a collective bargaining
agreement, but rather a contract between the employee and the local union).
107. 593 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
108. 593 F.2d at 96-97. Accord, Rosen v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees & Bartenders
Union, 637 F.2d 592, 596 (3d Cir. 1981).
109. 628 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2546 (1981).
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under independent trust indentures."'"0 The Supreme Court did not
address this issue in Journeymen; apparently the issue must await fur-
ther ad hoc judgments.
C. Finding Appropriate Parties for a Section 301 Cause of Action.
In determining federal removal jurisdiction, a court must consider
not only whether the cause of action is founded on a violation of a
section 301 contract, but also whether the parties are suitable for fed-
eral jurisdiction under section 301. A significant question in Journey-
men is whether the dispute. was in fact "between . . . labor
organizations" as section 301 requires. The Court finessed the issue.
Undeniably, both a local union and its parent union are labor organi-
zations, the Court observed. It is well settled that either a local or a
parent may bring a case under section 301. Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, section 301 creates federal jurisdiction in a dispute between the
local and the parent."' That reasoning is eminently enthymemical,
however, implying but not expressing that the local and parent are dif-
ferent labor organizations, not just aspects of a single entity, and that
the dispute was between them rather than within a single organization.
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger noted that a local is a "subordinate
body" to its parent and that the union constitution, to the extent that it
is a contract at all, is not a contract between the parent and locals, but
merely "between the union and its members or among the members
themselves .... ,,112 Further, the Chief Justice noted that the legisla-
tive history is devoid of any indication of congressional intent to sub-
ject internal union disputes to federal regulation.13
The question of appropriate parties for a section 301 action arises
in a different context when pension and benefit fund trustees are parties
110. 628 F.2d at 820. Accord, Smith v. Hickey, 482 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (non-remov-
able pension fund dispute did not turn on construction of collective bargaining agreement, but
rather required interpretation of the pension contracts under state law).
For a canvassing of cases on each side of the issue, see Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266,
1270 (7th Cir. 1978). In Reiherzer the court sidestepped the issue of whether a pension benefit
claim provides federal removal jurisdiction via section 301. That court found an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction under sections 502(a)(l)(B) and 502(e)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1 132(a)(l)(B), (e)(1) (1976), which provides federal and state jurisdiction over civil actions by
participants to recover benefits under pension plans. Hence removal was allowed from state court.
This holding was limited, however, to suits against pension trustees for improperly withholding
benefits. 581 F.2d at 1271. See also Buczynski v. General Motors Corp., 456 F. Supp. 867 (D.N.J.
1978) (finding alternate bases of federal jurisdiction under section 301 and ERISA), vacated on
other grounds, 616 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir.), cert. dirmissed sub nonz. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 448 U.S. 911 (1980).
111. 101S. Ct. at 2549.
112. Id. at 2553 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 2553-54.
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to the litigation. For instance, when trustees of an employee benefit
fund brought a state cause of action against trustees of an interrelated
benefit fund, a federal district court would not sanction removal pursu-
ant to section 301 regardless of whether the breach might have im-
paired performance of the bargaining agreement, for neither litigant
was a party to that agreement."14 But when a trustee brought a state
claim against an employer for failure to contribute to the trust fund as
required by the bargaining agreement, another district court allowed
removal."15 Even though the trustee was not a party to the bargaining
agreement, the essence of his complaint was the employer's breach of
his contractual obligation. Because the fund's activities benefited both
labor and management, the court reasoned that the trustees could not
be considered a component of an employer association suing another
component of the association." 6 Hence the claim alleged a contractual
violation sufficient to invoke section 301 jurisdiction."17
III. TowARD GREATER JURISDICTIONAL CERTAINTY
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent adversion to ad hoc deter-
minations of section 301 jurisdiction on the pleadings, in many cases ad
hoc determinations are inevitable. This is especially true when the
plaintiff has commenced the action in state court without pleading a
federal cause of action and the defendant seeks removal based on an
imputed federal element. Close pragmatic judgments in individual
cases, however, should not foreclose the development of clear jurisdic-
tional standards for the class of cases as a whole. 1 8 When the criteria
of the well-pleaded complaint rule are relaxed, courts lose a useful tool
for determining federal jurisdiction and must grapple with questions of
federal primacy and expediency while merely guessing at the federal
interests implicated in the cause of action.19
When a court looks beyond the complaint to find a basis for re-
moval, the ultimate determination of jurisdiction sometimes seems pri-
marily a function of the court's willingness to promote federal forums
for labor cases and to tiptoe about the pleadings to reach a conclusory
114. Smith v. Hickey, 482 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
115. Ziegler v. Howard P. Foley Co., 468 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. La. 1979). See also Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459 (1960) (non-party trustees may enforce royalty provisions in
federal court).
116. 468 F. Supp. at 224.
117. See also New York Times Co. v. Rosenberg, No. 79-5504 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1981) (al-
lowing removal of suit by employer against union business agent for inducing a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement).
118. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 908.
119. See id 916.
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result. For example, in Lambright v. Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. 120
truck drivers sued in state court for back wages after the employer al-
legedly reduced the mileage allowance provided for in the bargaining
agreement. Upon removal, the federal court could find no dispute over
the terms of the contract, no disagreement between management and
union, no need for federal expertise, and no question requiring a uni-
form national policy; therefore it remanded the suit to state court. The
federal court saw only one issue: whether or not the hourly rates were
reduced-a cause of action not governed exclusively by federal law. 121
Interestingly, the court ignored the one consideration that would seem
to bring the case directly under section 301: the plaintiff's claim of a
breach of the collective bargaining agreement.
In Talbot v. National Super Markets,122 on the other hand, the
court allowed removal of a state court claim for back wages by adopt-
ing a curiously negative approach: removal was allowed via section
301 because that section did not preclude the relief sought, because in-
dividuals are not barred from bringing suit under that section, and be-
cause the court could not know "whether the particular wage claim
raised 'significant' issues of federal law without a thorough examina-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement and the facts giving rise to
the claim." 12 Such an approach effectively turns the well-pleaded
complaint rule inside-out.
National labor policy must be protected efficiently, but Congress
in enacting section 301 did not intend to supplant state jurisdiction.124
Some labor-related conduct is not so closely interwoven with federally
protected activity that state regulation of it would interfere with na-
120. 335 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. La. 1971).
121. Id at 29.
122. 372 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. La. 1974).
123. Id at 1052-53.
124. See Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Jones v. General Tire & Rubber
Co., 541 F.2d 660, 663-64 (7th Cir. 1976); 93 CONG. REc. 5146 (daily ed. May 12, 1947), reprinted
in SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1497 (1974) ("[W']e give to employers the
right to sue a union in interstate commerce, in a Federal court, for violation of contract. It does
not go beyond that") (remarks of Sen. Ball). See also 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948) (questioniug consti-
tutionality of section 301 because of its potential expansion of federal jurisdiction). Indeed, the
Supreme Court at first held that the provisions of section 301 were only procedural in nature. See
Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). A
decade after the enactment of section 301, however, the Court reversed itself and held in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), that the provisions of section 301 were
substantive, authorizing federal courts to formulate a body of federal common law over labor
disputes. Justice Frankfurter, in his long and vigorous dissent, noted that the legislative history of
the Act did not support such a view and predicted that the majority's holding would generate
conflicts between state and federal courts. Id at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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tional labor policy. As Professor Wechsler has noted, "The problem is,
therefore, to determine when relatively final state determination in-
volves least risk of error upon federal matters, or when such risk as it
involves is counterbalanced by the disadvantages of an original juris-
diction in the federal courts."' 125 The question is the strength of the
linkage of federal issues. No unqualified solution is possible. Some
tests of jurisdiction, however, are more appropriate than others.
For instance, it is too loose a test of federal removal jurisdiction to
ask only whether the federal issue arises from "a common nucleus of
operative facts" of the collective bargaining agreemeni,126 or only
whether the claim speaks to the enforceability and interpretation of the
collective contract. 127 Such tests demand only a hypothetical relation-
ship between the claim actually brought and the federal claim that
might be induced upon removal. Such tests invite endless inquiry into
cause and effect. 128
A more appropriate test of removal jurisdiction asks whether a sig-
nificant federal claim within the plain meaning of section 301 inheres
and subsists in the complaint. This test demands a categorical rather
than a hypothetical relation between the complaint and the federal is-
sue. It closely resembles the traditional formulation of the well-
pleaded complaint rule, but de-emphasizes the form of the complaint
in deference to its substance. For removal jurisdiction to be invoked
pursuant to section 301, this standard requires that there be an underly-
ing violation, whether alleged or not, of the collective bargaining agree-
ment or of a contract between labor organizations; that the parties to
125. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 216, 218 (1948).
126. This standard was advanced, for example, in Chapman v. S.E. Region I.L.G.W.U.
Health and Welfare Recreation Fund, 265 F. Supp. 675, 679 (D.S.C. 1967).
127. See, ag., Hayes v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 442, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (al-
lowing removal of profit-sharing dispute that hinged upon "the correct interpretation and applica-
tion of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement"); Talbot v. National Super Mkts., 372 F.
Supp. 1050 (E.D. La. 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 122-23 supra. Cf. Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REv. 274, 305 (1948) ("It
would be unfortunate if there should develop any strong tendency to look to the federal courts to
settle questions concerning the interpretation and application of collective bargaining agree-
ments").
128. Cf. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936), in which Justice Cardozo remarked:
As in problems of causation, so here in the search for the underlying law. If we follow
the ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have their source or
their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself
with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit,
the courts have formulated the distinction between controversies that are basic and those
that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely possi-
ble. We shall be lost in a maze if we put that compass by.
Id at 118.
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the suit come properly within the purview of section 301; and that
broad policy considerations be subordinated to the "real" claims raised
in the plaintiff's complaint. This standard would not necessarily re-
solve close questions like those raised in Journeymen. It would, how-
ever, insist rightly upon an inquiry into the federal interests involved in
a state cause of action for which removal is sought and would inhibit
the deliquescence of a holding such as Journeymen's into cases arising
about its factual confines. Such a standard would preserve the interests
of litigants, foster national labor policy, and inject a modicum of cer-
tainty into an area suffering from a lack of it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Cohen has noted, "The 'well-pleaded' requirement will
not yield to good, pragmatic reasons for rejecting it in individual cases
or groups of cases." 129 It is disturbing, then, to find the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit declaring dogmatically that "[t]he court's re-
characterization of [the employee's] complaint. . . is required by fed-
eral preemption doctrines."1 30 Perhaps the court merely misspoke it-
self, for the process of recharacterizing a state claim as federal is clearly
antecedent to and independent of the process of finding that claim pre-
empted. But the statement is characteristic of the question-begging
stance often adopted by courts in determining removal jurisdiction in
labor cases. If the original claim does not invoke federal jurisdiction,
explicitly or implicitly, then "recharacterization" of that claim is hardly
justifiable and certainly not required. The proper concern should be
whether federal law encompasses the cause of action, not whether the
plaintiff might have couched his claim in terms of federal law. If com-
peting rights and policies appear equiponderant, then in fairness to the
plaintiff, state jurisdiction should prevail.131
The well-pleaded complaint rule is no sterile formality.' 32 Re-
laxing its requirements serves only to efface the boundaries of federal
jurisdiction.
Michael B. Thornton
129. Cohen, supra note 33, at 915.
130. Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980), discussed at note 91
supra.
131. Some courts have insisted that if any doubts arise about removability, those doubts
should be resolved in favor of remand. See Butler v. Polk, 592 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1979); Sepia
Trucking Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 705, No. 80 C 403 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 1980);
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 13, § 3721, at 535-36 and cases collected therein.
132. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950).
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